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M. Therese Lysaught 
WRONGFUL LIFE? 
The strange case of Nicholas Perruche 
he law tells stories. So argues Catholic legal 
scholar Mary Ann Glendon in her short but fas- 
cinating book, Abortion and Divorce in Western 
Law. Glendon draws on anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz's claim that law is a "culture system'--it " ells sto- 
ries about he culture that helped to shape it and which in 
turn it shapes: stories about who we are, where we came 
from, and where we are going." Law's stories, Geertz and 
Glendon argue, cannot but constitute who we are. Its lan- 
guage and concepts become part of our ordinary language 
and influence how we perceive reality. 
At times, though, a law attempts to advance a story that 
seems radically out of step with what we understand tobe 
true, with who we believe we are or who we wish to become. 
Such cases illustrate law's constitutive power. A poignant 
example that has been wending its way through the French 
courts is the case of eighteen-year-old Nicholas Perruche, 
who recently won a claim for "wrongful life." 
Nicholas was born in January 1983. Four weeks into his 
gestation, his four-year-old sister contracted German measles. 
His mother, aware that German measles can cause severe 
congenital handicaps, told her physician that if she tested 
positive for the disease she wanted an abortion rather than 
risk giving birth to a severely handicapped child. Mrs. Per- 
ruche underwent two blood tests, two weeks apart. Labo- 
ratory error gave contradictory results. Instead of pursuing 
the matter further, her physician advised her that she could 
"safely continue her pregnancy." 
Nicholas's profound handicaps became vident soon after 
his birth. He cannot hear, cannot speak, and is mostly blind. 
His heart is weak. He moves only when carried or put into 
a wheelchair. Mrs. Perruche suffered amental breakdown 
when Nicholas was two, requiring psychiatric care. His par- 
ents subsequently divorced. 
Today, Nicholas lives in a government institution and 
spends alternate weekends with his mother and father. But 
his parents were concerned that after the age of twenty, he 
would probably have to leave the institution and require 
permanent private care. The family first went to court in 
1988. Arguing that the error of the laboratory and the physi- 
cian had brought suffering to the family, the Perruches were 
awarded approximately $13,000 in damages. 
Had the case ended here, it would have been ovel enough, 
presenting the first appearance in French jurisprudence of 
a concept indigenous to the U.S. legal landscape, namely, 
"wrongful birth." "Wrongful birth" suits claim that the neg- 
ligence of health-care providers (for example, botching ster- 
ilizations, failing to inform about a prenatal test, or 
misdiagnosing a fetus's handicap) prevent the mother from 
exercising her right of autonomy and thus to abortion. Wrong- 
ful birth claims have been advanced when the "birth" re- 
sulted in children both with and without disabilities. 
Wrongful birth cases differ from traditional malpractice 
suits in two ways. Traditional malpractice suits (which in 
these situations might be brought under "wrongful con- 
ception" or "wrongful pregnancy") describe the "damage" 
as a medical or physical harm to the mother. This would not 
include the existence of a child one would rather not have. 
Consequently, malpractice compensation is generally lim- 
ited to recovery for damages associated with pregnancy it- 
self (loss of wages, costs of pregnancy and delivery, etc.) as 
well as emotional duress. In wrongful birth cases, the dam- 
age lies not with the pregnancy itself--Mrs. Perruche, for 
example, was not opposed to being pregnant nor to giving 
birth to a second child. The damage lies rather in the bur- 
den that this particular child imposes on the life of the par- 
ents and family. Wrongful birth suits seek additional com- 
pensation for wages lost because of the care required by spe- 
cial-needs children, and for the medical, educational, and 
emotional costs associated with the child's disability. Typi- 
cally, these costs are only compensated until the child reach- 
es the age of majority. 
But Nicholas's case is not solely one of wrongful birth. In 
addition to arguing for damages on their own behalf, the 
Perruches sued the laboratory and the physician on Nicholas's 
behalf, arguing that Nicholas himself had been harmed by
their errors. On four occasions, Nicholas was awarded am- 
ages, but each time the verdicts were reversed on appeal. 
Last July, the Cour de Cassation, the French equivalent of
the Supreme Court, upheld a 1991 lower court ruling that 
awarded Nicholas damages. The court argued that because 
the errors of the physician and the laboratory "had prevented 
Mrs. Perruche from exercising her choice to end the preg- 
Commonweal 9 March 22, 2002 
Blue Wagon 
Left out in the rain far too long, 
For too many seasons, now rust 
Has crept along its stenciled sides, 
Turned its white wheels brown and black, 
Left its steering rudder scoured 
Down to the metal of its base. 
It works still, complaining tothe touch 
As over grass and clumps of earth 
It follows feet and frantic dogs 
Into the light of evening. 
Things are like this all the time--- 
Thoughts too. They are molded out of 
Baseness and into it slyly turn, 
Neither decline nor fall, only 
Windings this way and that 
As if seeking, not surety, not truth, 
But a flume of seasoned wear. 
Harold Bordwel l  
nancy in order to avoid the birth of a handicapped child, the 
latter can ask for compensation fordamages resulting from 
his handicap." The Perruches were awarded about $68,000 
with a further $250,000 to cover the cost of Nicholas's life- 
time care. 
With this decision, the French courts imported the addi- 
tional U .S. concept of "wrongful life." "Wrongful life" suits 
do not claim that the physician's negligence caused the im- 
pairment (as would a malpractice case). Rather, "wrongful 
life" suits argue that the health-care provider's error is re- 
sponsible for the plaintiff having been born and consequently 
experiencing the suffering and incurring the expense caused 
by the impairment. The impairment causes the harm. The 
"wrong" is attributed tothe birth itself, implying that ha his 
being born the plaintiff's rights were violated. Nicholas, the 
wrongful life daim implies, had a right to be terminated be- 
fore birth. 
The ruling caused an uproar in France. Persons with dis- 
abilities criticized the decision as demeaning of them as 
human persons. Ethicists criticized it for encouraging eu- 
genics. As 2001 wore on, opposition to the ruling increased, 
culminating in a strike of sorts by outraged physicians. In 
January the twenty4our-hundred-strong National Syndi- 
cate of Gynecologists and Obstetricians began refusing to 
perform routine ultrasound scans. The doctors argued on 
pragmatic grounds, citing fear of lawsuits hould disabled 
babies be born. But their action resonated with a deeper sen- 
sibility across the country. Shortly after the strike began, the 
French National Assembly called an emergency session and 
passed legislation forbidding plaintiffs to seek damages sim- 
ply for having been born. The bill pas~d by an overwhelming 
margin. 
The first successful "wrongful life" case in the United 
States was the 1984 decision of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in the case of Peter Procanick (whose mother, like 
Josette Perruche, contracted German measles in her first 
trimester). But Procanick saw no overwhelming congres- 
sional response. U.S. obstetricians and gynecologists cer- 
tainly did not go on strike. Ethicists eem to have barely 
batted an eye. Why? And why was the French response so 
different? How might we account for these differences? One 
answer, I would suggest, lies in our national stories, as cap- 
tured in our respective abortion laws. 
What is the story that French abortion law tells? Two fea- 
tures seem very similar to U.S. statutes. In France, abortion 
is available up to the tenth week of pregnancy toany woman 
"whose condition places her in distress." "Distress" is sim- 
ply defined by the woman. After ten weeks, only "thera- 
peutic" abortions are permitted, for situations that pose a 
threat o the woman's health or when "there is a strong pos- 
sibility that the unborn child is suffering from a particular- 
ly serious disease or condition considered incurable at tile 
time of diagnosis." 
Three features of France's abortion law, however, provide 
clear points of departure from the U.S. situation. First, the 
language of the statute clearly names the fundamental issue 
as one involving human life. Its first sentence r ads: "The 
law guarantees the respect of every human being from the 
commencement of life. There shall be no derogation from 
this principle xcept in cases of necessity." Second, the statute 
specifically outlines ways in which the state is to take an ac- 
tive part in promoting respect for life: "The teaching of this 
principle and its consequences, the provision of information 
on the problems of life and of national and international de- 
mography, education toward responsibility, the acceptance 
of the child in society, and family-oriented policy are na- 
tional obligations." Toward these ends, the state provides 
substantial financial support for women and their children. 
Finally, the statute mandates several procedures--includ- 
ing a counseling session--designed to make the woman 
aware of, and able to choose, alternatives to abortion. 
As such, the story told by French abortion law seeks to 
balance, as Glendon otes, compassion for pregnant women 
with concern for fetal ife and expresses the commitment of 
society as a whole to minimize occasions when a tragic choice 
has to be made between the two. Nonetheless, the overar- 
ching theme of the story is that of "respect for every human 
being from the moment of commencement," a respect that 
the state is obliged to foster. That the French believe this to 
be the state's obligation makes ense in a country twice rav- 
aged within recent memory by war. (This link is seen even 
more clearly in German abortion laws, where the courts ex- 
pressly root their commitment tothe protection of unborn 
human life in the experiences of World War II.) 
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The claim that Nicholas was harmed by not being aborted 
tells a very different story. It suggests that "respect" entails 
destruction rather than nurture. (This claim is currently ad- 
vanced in the United States within the human embryonic 
stem-cell debate.) It does not suggest that abortion is a trag- 
ic action of individual conscience that the state will allow as 
a compromise while working against i . Rather, it suggests 
that at times the destruction fhuman life is a "fight," a good 
to be pursued. Ironically, in a dark inversion of the claim to 
a right to life, the right to be terminated prior to birth be- 
comes the only right fetuses with disabilities possess. By is- 
suing this decision, France's highest court suggested that 
the state ought o support the destruction ofspecific human 
beings. 
The rejection of the court's ruling by the French populace, 
medical professionals, nd legislators suggests that this is 
not their story. It does not describe who they understand 
themselves tobe. And it is not who they want to become. 
In the United States, of course, Roe v. Wade and subse- 
quent legislation tell a very different story. U.S. laws start 
out not from respect for every human being but rather from 
the fundamental conflict between a woman's individual lib- 
erty or privacy and a "nonperson." Moreover, U.S. laws pro- 
hibit states from instituting the kinds of policies that are 
required in France in order to make women aware of and 
able to choose alternatives toabortion. Such policies have 
been repeatedly interpreted ascreating an "undue burden." 
Of course, given the dismal public support for maternity 
and child rearing in the United States, real alternatives do 
not exist for many women. Thus, the U.S. legal narrative tells 
a story in which the state is limited in its obligation to pro- 
tect human life and has little responsibility oactively nur- 
ture and foster the lives of those within its purview. In this 
context, "wrongful life" is the logical extension of the story 
told by Roe. 
But the question remains: What about Nicholas? The French 
were unwilling to allow him to be described in terms that 
rendered his life not worth living. They refused to cast him 
as a person whose burdens outweigh is inherent value and 
negate the goodness of his existence. They did not wish the 
concepts associated with "wrongful life" to enter into the 
way they see and will see persons with disabilities. 
What resources might we in the United States have to 
counter the description ofpersons with disabilities offered 
by "wrongful life" cases? The picture is mixed. The law it- 
self might provide one antidote. Currently only three states 
recognize wrongful life suits--New Jersey, California, and 
Washington--while twenty-three state appellate courts have 
refused them. This, coupled with the constitutive power of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act--contested though it 
may be challenges the normative claims of "wrongful life" 
suits vis-a-vis persons with disabilities. 
But this very account of our legal situation reveals that 
the status of persons with disabilities in the United States 
remains deeply ambiguous. Those who wish to forge a dif- 
ferent reality for persons with disabilities will need to turn 
to other stories and practices. I will end by offering just one 
powerful alternative practice that emerges, coincidentally, 
from France: the communities of L'Arche. 
Founded by Jean Vanier in 1964 and subsequently ex- 
ported to twenty-four countries including the United States, 
L'Arche works to create communities of friendship between 
voltmteers and persons with disabilities--disabilities even 
as profound as Nicholas's. L'Arche intentionally embodies 
an alternative narrative of who persons with disabilities are 
and puts that narrative into practice. Against he belief that 
persons like Nicholas are so profoundly damaged that the 
good of their existence isnegated, L'Arche aims to help them 
gain a deeper sense of their own worth, as persons worthy 
of love and friendship, whose value and beauty lie hidden 
in their weakness. It is a practice premised on a different 
story--not one of privacy and "nonpersons." It is based on 
a belief in the reality of the Trinitarian God, a community of
persons, in whose image and likeness all of us--visibly hand- 
icapped or not--are made. By seeking to live this reality, 
L'Arche makes its claims "come true" even for persons with 
profound handicaps and provides a real alternative tothe 
story embodied only in the technologies of prenatal sur- 
veillance. In so doing, it not only challenges us to see per- 
sons with di~bilifies differently, itchallenges us to understand 
ourselves, and so to live, differently. 
L'Arche and its work, of course, does not deny the tragedy 
of Nicholas's condition, the loss of who he could have been, 
and the anguish of his family. It does not deny the pain ex- 
perienced by those with disabilities, but locates their pain pri- 
marily in society's rejection of them as persons. "Wrongful 
life" claims embody this rejection profoundly. By making 
manifest the dignity of persons with disabilities, L'Arche chal- 
lenges the belief that tragedy, loss, and anguish are the only 
words needed to describe Nichotas's life and that Nicholas's 
very existence isa wrong above all to himself. [] 
M. Therese Lysaught is associate professor in the Department of
Religious Studies at the University of Da ton. 
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